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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., ! 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political : 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH, 
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
: Case No. 900234-CA 
: ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 16 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff and Appellee, Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company, Inc. ("Wadsworth"), pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, respectfully petitions the Court for a 
rehearing. Counsel for Wadsworth certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. This Petition for 
Rehearing is made on the ground that the Court overlooked or 
misapprehended dispositive points of law and fact. Those issues 
are: 
1. Whether the decision of Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1974), upon which the Court based its opinion is 
distinguishable and, therefore, inapplicable to the legal and 
factual arguments presented on this appeal. 
2. Whether the contract was authorized by ordinance and 
whether the approval and resolution of the Salt Lake County 
Commission for bidding the project under bid requirements and 
1 
ordinances requiring award of the contract to the low responsible 
bidder was approval by the Commission for the contract, 
3. Whether the obligations and covenants required of 
Wadsworth by Salt Lake County in its bid requirements were binding 
upon Wadsworth, and if so, whether these obligations were supported 
by consideration thereby creating mutual obligations on the part 




THE RAPP v. SALT LAKE CITY DECISION IS DISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM THE PRESENT CASE IN THAT IT DID NOT INVOLVE THE 
LEGAL AND FACTUAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON THIS APPEAL AND, 
THEREFORE, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, 
The Court's decision that no contractual relationship existed 
between Salt Lake County and Wadsworth and that the County was not 
required to award to Wadsworth is based upon Rapp v. Salt Lake 
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). The decision does not address 
Wadsworth's argument that the Rapp decision is clearly 
distinguishable from the present case in that different legal 
issues were presented. The Court in Rapp did not address the 
specific ordinance in this case requiring award to the lowest 
responsible bidder, but rather was based only upon a more 
generalized ordinance requiring approval of contracts by the city 
2 
council. Rapp dealt only with the general common law duty of a 
municipality not to act with bad faith, fraud or collusion with 
respect to awarding contracts and with principles of implied 
contract. The issues in this case involve express obligations 
imposed by County ordinance and an express promise in the bid 
documents to award the project to the low responsible bidder. 
The Rapp case was based upon the reasoning that an ordinary 
invitation for bids is not an offer to be accepted by the bidder 
but only a request for offers from the bidder. In the present 
case, the Invitation for Bids was much more than an ordinary 
invitation or advertisement for bids. The County let the project 
for bid under Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, and written bid 
provisions expressly providing that the project would be awarded 
to the low bidder according to the contract documents upon which 
the bids were based. When Wadsworth submitted its bid, it agreed 
in return to undertake significant obligations to the County. The 
County required Wadsworth to covenant to hold its bid open for 60 
days, to provide a bid bond on which Wadsworth was liable to the 
County, and further to enter into the final contract upon 
satisfaction of the condition that it was the lowest responsible 
bidder. (R. 247, 248, 263). Additionally, the County's bid 
documents provided for liquidated and other contractual measures 
of damages in the event Wadsworth failed to enter into and perform 
Such a general ordinance cannot override the specific 
requirement in Section 18-1-1 which contains the mandatory 
requirement that the project shall be awarded to the low bidder. 
Flovd v. Western Surgical AssociatesP 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
3 
the contract if it was the low bidder. (R. 263, 247, 248). The 
circumstances presented in this case go well beyond the ordinary 
and plain request for bids addressed in Rapp. 
Furthermore, the Rapp case did not address the fundamental 
principles of contract law which, when applied to the particular 
facts of this case clearly establish a mutuality of obligation on 
the part of the parties and the existence of an express preliminary 
contract between Wadsworth and Salt Lake County for the award of 
the construction project to the lowest responsible bidder. When 
Salt Lake County requested bids, it promised to award the contract 
to the lowest responsible bidder. Swinerton & Walberg Company v. 
City of Inglewood, etc., 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974); Owen of 
Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County, 648 F. 2d 1084, 1095 (6th Circuit 
1981). Where a promise, such as the County's promise to award to 
the low responsible bidder, is supported by another promise or 
other consideration, the promise is enforceable and a binding 
contract is formed. Resource Management Co. v Western Ranch, 706 
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). 
None of the foregoing factual and legal points were addressed 
by Rapp and require attention by this Court in deciding the issues 
presented on this appeal. 
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POINT II 
THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND 
WADSWORTH ARE AUTHORIZED BY ORDINANCE AND APPROVED BY THE 
COUNTY COMMISSION. 
The Court's opinion, at page three, states that the "[n]o 
contract is binding on the County...until it has been approved by 
the Board or authorized by ordinance or resolution." The opinion 
further states that Wadsworth presented no argument that the 
contract was authorized by ordinance or resolution. To the 
contrary, the primary thrust of Wadsworth*s brief is that Salt Lake 
County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, expressly authorized and required the 
contract in question, and that the County Commission approved the 
contract when it approved the bidding of the project under the 
ordinance and provisions for contracting with the low bidder 
authorized the contract. (Wadsworth Brief pp. 11-16). 
Salt Lake County was required, under its own ordinance to 
award the subject construction project and contract with Wadsworth 
as the low, responsible bidder. Revised Statutes of Salt Lake 
County, § 18-1-1, provides that the contract "...shall be let by 
competitive bidding after advertisement, to the lowest responsible 
bidder..." The bid documents prepared by the County further 
provide that "the award of contract, if made, would be to the 
lowest, responsive, responsible bidder, pursuant to county 
ordinance." (R. 2 62). Salt Lake County had a mandatory duty to 
award the construction contract to the low responsible bidder. 
Fowler v. Citv of Anchorage, 583 P.2d 817, 820 (Alaska 1978)(City 
has a statutory duty to do what an ordinance says "shall" be done) ; 
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Carpet City, Inc. v. Stillwater Municipal Hospital Authority, 53 6 
P.2d 335 (Oklahoma 1975); Gerard Construction Company v. City of 
Manchester, 415 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (N.H. 1980); R. E. Short Company 
v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 343 (Minn. 1978).2 
The opinion refers to Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 2.04.1003 
which requires the contract be approved by the County Commission 
or be authorized by ordinance or resolution. As argued in 
Wadsworth's brief, the contract in this case was authorized and 
required by County ordinance and approved by the County Commission. 
When the County Commission approved bidding of the project, the 
contract documents and specifications were fully reduced to 
writing. The contract was authorized by the ordinance requiring 
contracting with the low bidder and the County Commission expressly 
approved the contract when it approved bidding under the ordinance 
and bid instructions requiring the contract with the low bidder. 
(Wadsworth brief, p. 16) . Furthermore, the more specific ordinance 
It has similarly been stated that "since government by 
conduct sets an example for all of us, it, above all, must obey its 
own laws.fl Swinerton & Walbera Company v. City of Inalewood. etc., 
114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974) (citing Holmstead v United Statesy 
277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 960 (1928). Salt 
Lake County was bound by its own ordinance to award the contract 
to Wadsworth as the low responsible bidder on the project. 
The designation of this ordinance at the relevant time in 
this matter was Section 1-2-9, Salt Lake County Ordinances. 
This is always the case in public competitive bidding 
because it is the contract and specifications written and furnished 
by the municipality upon which bids are based. In fact, the bid 
requirements in this case required the bid to be based upon these 
contract documents furnished by the County with approval from the 
Commission. 
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§ 18-1-1 requiring the contract with the low bidder controls over 
the more generalized ordinance § 2.04.100. Floyd v. Western 
Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989). 
Although the commission purported to reject Wadsworth's bid, 
this is not the same as disapproving the contract itself. The 
contract itself was already approved, authorized and required by 
the County's own ordinance. Section 18-1-5 of the County's 
ordinances only allows rejection of a bid for a "valid reason" 
which is limited to where the bidder is not "responsible". In this 
case it is undisputed that Wadsworth is a responsible contractor. 
Where no valid reason for rejection of the bid exists, the 
commission's purported rejection of the bid cannot be construed as 
disapproval of the bidding process or contract the commission 
itself approved and which was authorized and required by § 18-1-
1. 
The Court's opinion overlooks and does not address Wadsworth's 
argument that the contract was authorized by ordinance and approved 
by the County commission. In fact, the opinion states Wadsworth 
made no such argument. Wadsworth, therefore, is entitled to 
rehearing on this vital aspect of its case. 
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POINT III 
THE OBLIGATIONS AGREED TO BY WADSWORTH IN RETURN FOR THE 
COUNTY'S OBLIGATION TO AWARD TO WADSWORTH AS THE LOW 
BIDDER CREATED MUTUAL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. 
The Court's opinion does not address the effect of the mutual 
obligations and consideration between the parties which establish 
the contract asserted by Wadsworth. The County bid documents and 
ordinance required award and contract with the low responsible 
bidder. In return Wadsworth undertook significant contractual 
obligations. Without addressing these issues, the impact of the 
Court's decision that no contractual obligation exists on the part 
of the County is that the obligations purportedly imposed by the 
County, and other municipalities, in its bid instructions and 
documents are illusory and unenforceable. 
When Salt Lake County requested bids, it promised to award the 
contract to the lowest responsible bidder under § 18-1-1. 
Swinerton & Walbera Company v. City of Incrlewood, etc., 40 
Cal.App.3d 104, 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974); Owen, supra. The 
County's promise to award the contract to the low responsible 
bidder was supported by consideration in the form of a benefit to 
the County in obtaining the lowest available price for the work, 
Owen, supra, and by Wadsworth's covenants, inter alia, to hold the 
bid open for sixty days, to provide a bid bond, and to be liable 
for contractual liquidated damages if it failed to perform the 
project if the low bidder. 
Where a promise, such as the County's promise to award to the 
low responsible bidder, is supported by another promise or other 
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consideration, such as the covenants made by Wadsworth, the promise 
is enforceable and a binding contract is formed. Resource 
Management Co, v Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985); 
Sucrarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 
1980). Wadsworth's remedy for breach of such contract is recovery 
from the County of Wadsworthfs lost profits. Alexander v. Brown, 
646 P. 2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). 
The Court's opinion does not address the incongruity of the 
County's argument that there is no contract despite the mutual 
obligations of the parties. The County asserts that the 
obligations undertaken by Wadsworth are binding upon Wadsworth. 
The obligations the County seeks to impose upon Wadsworth can only 
be binding, however, if there is some consideration to support 
these obligations. The consideration here, is the County's 
obligation to award to the low bidder. The Court must consider the 
effect and ramifications on the entire public competitive bidding 
system in the State of Utah if the Court holds there is no 
contractual obligation. The result is to open the door for low 
bidders on public projects to ignore the bid provisions of holding 
bids open and challenge the contractual liquidated damages 
provisions for withdrawing its bid and refusing to perform for the 
amount of the low bid. Low bidders will be permitted to withdraw 
their bids after opening and then negotiate for higher prices 
between its low bid and the next low bid. The integrity of the 
bidding system will be destroyed. 
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This threat to the foundation of public competitive bidding 
requires careful consideration of the purpose of such bidding. The 
Court's Opinion points out that the competitive bidding is for the 
benefit of the public. Opinion, p.4. The Opinion does not 
address, however, Wadsworth's argument that the bidding process 
necessarily also is intended to provide a fair forum for bidders. 
Piatt Elec. Sup, Inc. v. City of Seattle Div. of Pur, 16 Wash. App. 
265, 555 P.2d 421, 426 (1976). The protection of the public and 
integrity of the bidding process requires meaningful enforcement 
of enforcing the ordinances governing the competitive bidding 
process, i.e. monetary damages to wrongfully rejected bidders. 
Otherwise, if contractors have little faith in the bidding process, 
fewer contractors will bid, less competition will result and the 
public will pay higher prices. More significantly, if the fair 
forum intended by the bidding laws and ordinances are not 
adequately enforceable by those participating, then such ordinances 
and laws are rendered ineffectual and the intended protection of 
the public illusory. 
The practical necessity of providing an adequate remedy in the 
form of monetary damages was recognized in Airline Const, v. 
Ascension Parish School, 549 So.2d 1240 (La.App. 1989). In that 
case the County argued that a wrongfully rejected bidder was 
limited to injunctive relief only and could not recover monetary 
damages. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated: 
We believe these cases recognize that it would be unfair 
to establish a rule under which aggrieved bidders would 
in all instances be barred from obtaining monetary 
damages for violations of the Public Contracts Law. The 
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inequities of such a ruling are particularly telling in 
situations wherein an aggrieved bidder files an 
injunction suit prior to or immediately in response to 
an alleged wrongful award of a contract, but due to the 
lapse of time before a determination on the merits can 
be made, the project is near completion. The bidder in 
reality may no longer enjoin the project. It would be 
unfair to rule that the bidder in this scenario would not 
be entitled to some relief, perhaps in the form of 
monetary damages. 
Id. at 1246. The need to provide an adequate monetary remedy is 
particularly evident in this case where Wadsworth promptly filed 
this action and sought injunctive relief and where the remedy of 
injunctive relief failed due to the vigorous persistence of the 
County not to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this 
dispute. 
The ordinances and the bidding instructions in this case have 
a dual purpose to protect the bidders as well as the general 
public. Piatt Elec. , 555 P. 2d at 426. Both purposes suffer if 
Wadsworth is denied a remedy since the County would then be given 
free reign to arbitrarily ignore its obligation under the ordinance 
with impunity, thereby undermining the integrity and value of 
competitive bidding. Where Wadsworthfs bid was wrongfully rejected 
in violation of the ordinance, an appropriate remedy must be 
fashioned to effectuate the purposes of public competitive bidding. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's opinion overlooks several significant arguments 
presented by Wadsworth in its Brief and at the oral argument of 
this matter. The Rapp decision is distinguishable from this case 
and has no bearing on the factual and legal issues raised by 
Wadsworth which were not addressed by Rapp. The contract in this 
11 
case was approved by the County Commission and was expressly 
authorized and required by County ordinance. The mutual 
obligations on the part of Salt Lake County and Wadsworth, which 
were not present in the Rapp case, create a contractual 
relationship between the parties. The purposes of public 
competitive bidding in protecting the public require a meaningful 
remedy be afforded wrongfully rejected bidders in order to enforce 
the provisions and provide such protection. 
Dated this \ ^ y^day of October, 1991. 
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